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Nowadays we hear a great deal about cultural diversity, multiculturalism, conflict among civilizations, or, as the 
Beijing Forum suggests this year, harmony among civilizations. The significance of such attention being paid to 
cultures and civilizations lies in the fact that the world is becoming more and more globally interconnected and that 
the globe itself is developing its transnational character. When the world was understood primarily in terms of 
independent states and nations, cultures and civilizations did not seem to be of paramount importance. Cultures 
usually referred to intra-national, domestic phenomena, where “sub-cultures” would engage with one another to 
define the shape of national culture. Civilizations, in contrast, were more transnational, defining religions, ways of 
life, languages, and various other identities that cut across national boundaries. Because of this very fact, however, 
at a time when the nation was of paramount definer of one’s identity, international relations were of greater 
significance than inter-civilizational relations. To be sure, when the great powers expanded overseas and established 
control over vast territories of the earth, such action was often justified as a civilizing mission, but this was 
civilization in the service of the state, and when such powers dealt with one another, they did so as nations, not as 
civilizations. In the process they produced periods of cooperation and amity or of conflict and war. Since most 
independent, sovereign states, all products of the Enlightenment, were understood to be secular entities in which 
religions were subordinate to the state, civilizational features rarely intruded upon international relations, which 
were understood in geopolitical terms. Global affairs, in other words, were primarily conducted by nations as they 
pursued their political, military, and economic objectives.  
Civilization entered the vocabulary of interstate affairs when it served some ideological purposes. For instance, 
the Japanese referred to their war against Russia during 1904—1905 as a conflict between civilization and 
barbarism. Few characterized it as a war between two civilizations, although many were fascinated by the 
phenomenon of a struggle between an Asian country and a European country. Unlike the Middle Ages and the early 
modern period, when the struggle between Islam and Christendom was seen to denote a fundamental cleavage 
between nations, secular states were considered interchangeable so that, although Japanese and Russians represented 
different racial, religious, and other identities, the two countries shared their fundamental identities as nation states. 
That was why it was so easy for the two countries to make up their differences and restore a stable relationship so 
soon after the war. Likewise, during the Second World War, Japan sought to characterize the war as a struggle of 
Asian civilization against Western civilization. But the Asian war never was a conflict of civilizations, since the vast 
majority of Asians rejected Japanese pretensions to represent their civilization, while Japan tied itself to several 
nations Germany, Italy, the Soviet Union at least till 1945 that were also products of modern Western civilization. 
The United States and its allies, in the meantime, called their war one for the survival of Western civilization. But a 
world war in which an alliance included, besides North America and Western Europe, the Soviet Union, China, and 
(putatively) the colonial regions of Asia and Africa could not exactly be said to have been so closely identified with 
the West. Some, like Winston Churchill, called the global conflict a war for civilization, not a particular civilization 
but for a civilized way of life. That made more sense, but the fact that, as soon as the war ended, the alliance broke 
up (both due to the Cold War and to anti-colonial struggles) indicated that geopolitics, rather than civilization, was a 
more fundamental force in international relations. 
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Geopolitics may still be a key force in international relations today. But, unlike the first two-thirds of the 
twentieth century, in the recent decades it has ceased to be the only major factor in determining the shape of the 
world. To be sure, we are daily reminded of the powerful hold of nationalism and the potent idea of national interest 
that seem to provide their own justification. Territorial conflicts are common, so are immigration, trade, and other 
disputes among nations. And yet, in the last three or four decades, there have been fewer geopolitically determined 
international affairs than earlier. In part this is because of economic globalization that has produced networks of 
interlocking economic activities that are not territorially defined so that it is frequently very difficult, if not 
impossible, to determine what constitutes a national interest. Such traditional geopolitical calculations as national 
security, balance of power, and regional stability still preoccupy governmental leaders and their publics, but it would 
be difficult to write a history of international relations since at least the 1970s in the conventional framework. What 
concerns countries and people of the world are issues such as terrorism, environmental degradation, and human 
rights abuses, themes that do not neatly fit into the framework either of nationalism or of geopolitics.  
The role of civilizations in defining global order may be understood in such a context. Inter-relationships among 
civilizations have grown in importance in proportion as interstate affairs have lost their privileged place in global 
governance or world order. Many historians would agree that this shift, subtle as it was, began to be noticeable in 
the 1970s. These years are conventionally understood in terms of the history of the Cold War. Such themes as the 
U.S.-PRC rapprochement, as well as U.S.-USSR d tente and its replacement toward the end of the decade by a 
“second Cold War” still provide a frequently employed periodizing scheme. But it is clear that such geopolitical 
phenomena need to be put in the context of a global transformation that was undermining the primacy of the 
sovereign state in world affairs. Economically, both the oil shocks and the consequent energy crisis affected all 
countries, and they also brought “oil dollars” as a transnational currency even as the real dollar began to lose its 
privileged status as the pre-eminent medium of exchange. Despite the global recession brought about by the oil 
shocks, world trade and international financial transactions did not decline but instead steadily expanded. But the 
movement of goods, services, and capital grew more and more de-territorialized, as evidenced by a phenomenal rise 
in number of multinational business enterprises. At the same time, environmental issues as well as human rights 
violations came to be seen as being of global significance, solutions to which must therefore also be attempted 
through international and transnational cooperation. Led by the United Nations, there were created agencies and 
agendas for environmental protection as well as the promotion of human rights, now widely defined so as to include 
women’s, children’s, and colonial people’s rights, among others. But not just international cooperation, but 
cooperation among non-state organizations was promoted. During the 1970s the number of international NGOs 
increased spectacularly, and their cooperative activities defined the new transnationalism. 
The growth of transnational cooperation is a phenomenon of particular significance as we consider the 
relationship among civilizations. Few civilizations are interchangeable with nations, so the relationship among them 
is much less international than transnational. Ironically, however, it has not been very easy to promote transnational 
cooperation among civilizations. Fundamental is the question of governance, a mechanism for ensuring order. 
Global governance nowadays must include some mechanism for cooperation and compliance among civilizations 
as well as among nations. In the heyday of nation states, they were the principal actors to maintain, destroy, or re-
establish world order. At the same time, a global economic system functioned as a mechanism to facilitate the 
movement of goods, services, and capital. Whether geopolitics and global economy were interchangeable, or 
whether one necessitated the other, have been questions that historians have argued about. It is clear, in any event, 
that civilizations as such did not factor into the maintenance of global governance, except insofar as the most 
powerful and richest nations for several decades in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries came from 
the West so that modern Western values and ideologies constituted part of the international system, especially as 
regards international law. But to the extent that non-Western countries emulated Western nations in emerging as 
modern nation states, they embraced Western notions of sovereignty, central government, law and order, business 
transactions, and the like so that civilizational identities were not of critical importance. 
Global governance since the 1970s, however, has increasingly had to deal with those identities. This is due to a 
number of factors. First of all, geopolitical issues ceased to be as critical as earlier in view of the rapprochement 
between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, and the d tente between the United States and the 
Soviet Union that ultimately led to the ending of the Cold War. Second, many newly independent states, comprising 
the so-called Third World, developed their collective identity separate from that of the more advance countries. 
Third World nations established themselves as a group of seventy-seven within the United Nations and began 
7014  Akira Iriye / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 7012–7016
promoting the idea of a new world economic order. Even more important for considerations of civilizational issues, 
some of these countries began protesting against what they considered the West’s domination of information 
origination and dissemination. The world’s most influential newspapers, radio stations, and television networks were 
concentrated in a few advanced countries, and their overseas bureaus distributed news to the rest of the world. 
Protesting against the situation, some Third World countries called for a new information order in which they would 
have a say as to the sources and contents of news. Such apparent unity of the Third World, however, was belied by 
the fact that many of them continued to engage in wars, thus failing to contribute to local, let alone regional or 
global, order. The wars between India and Pakistan, China and Vietnam, Iran and Iraq, Israel and its neighbors, and 
among African countries are examples. Furthermore, civil wars in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Cyprus, and elsewhere 
undermined what stability these countries had. Indeed, to the extent that a nation state must be defined territorially 
and demographically, the frequent wars and civil wars made these countries nation states by name only.  
In the meantime, the longer existing countries of Europe came together to form a European Community in 1973, 
a culmination of the efforts begun right after the Second World War to put an end to more than three centuries of 
warfare among them. Fundamental to the formation of the European Community was the recognition that the 
concept of absolute sovereignty was incompatible with regional order, and that each state must be willing to give up 
a portion of its sovereign rights in order to protect its own security and interests within a regional framework. It is a 
measure of the passing of an era that not only in Europe but elsewhere, regional communities began to be 
constructed. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Central American Common Market were already 
active in the 1970s, to be followed by some others such as the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) in South 
America and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. While these regional schemes were initially designed to 
establish common markets for the members’ mutual benefit, cultural and civilizational issues were never far from 
the surface. The European Community, to take the clearest example, considered itself a union of nations that shared 
some values as well as economic interests, values that are usually traced back to the Enlightenment. Thus, all 
member states were expected to respect human rights as well as to cooperate in protecting the natural environment. 
Ultimately, these principles would be written into the constitution of the European Union that grew out of the 
European Community. According to the EU constitution, all the member states must accept such principles as 
human rights and environmentalism.  
The mention of human rights and environmentalism take us back to our discussion of the growing importance of 
civilizational identities and issues. It was no accident that in the 1970s, the decade that saw the transnationalization 
of human rights and environmental questions, the issue of inter-civilizational relationship also became a keen 
concern of the world community. Both human rights and environmental protection denote an attitude and a way of 
life. To protect the rights of women, children, the poor, the handicapped, and many categories of minorities means 
we are postulating an ideal society in which discrimination is not practiced in the relationship between men and 
women, adults and children, or members of different social strata. Whether Christians, Moslems, Buddhists, Hindus, 
and others all share such a principle would now become an important question since human rights would henceforth 
be matters for the global community to concern itself with. Before human rights could be protected and their 
violations effectively dealt with, some dialogue between civilizations would be required.  
The same goes for environmental protection. There has to be some shared human respect to honor, respect, and 
conserve the physical environment. Is there a common attitude throughout the world toward nature? It is often said 
that in the West the natural environment is seen as an object of human exploration and conquest, whereas in the East 
the stress is on man’s living together with nature. Such a dichotomy would be too simplistic, and it must be 
recognized that modern efforts to conserve and preserve nature began in the West. Moreover, some Third World 
countries have protested against international efforts to preserve the natural environment at the expense of economic 
development. In any event, to the extent that each civilization defines its own attitude toward the physical world, 
especially toward other living things (animals and plants), some shared ground across civilizational divides would 
have to be found if an effective environmental program were to be instituted globally.  
The question of who decides on such issues is also interesting, for during the 1970s many non-state players 
became involved in global issues, above all multinational business enterprises and international non-governmental 
organizations. Many of them were concerned with human rights and environmental issues, cooperating with one 
another and with international organizations such as the UN, as well as with some willing states, to accomplish their 
aims. Without such non-state actors, the global agenda would not have been promoted as vigorously. They saw that 
national security was too restricting a concept in a global, transnational age. Instead, they began talking about 
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human security, which would include the security to live with dignity, to enjoy clean air and water, and to cohabit 
the earth with other beings.  
The rise of religious extremism, which also became noticeable during the 1970s, can likewise be put in such a 
context. Just when talk of human security and global community was becoming common, overcoming differences 
among nations and peoples, the influence of religious extremists became recognizable. It was as if sharply defined 
religious groups were emerging to take over from sovereign states the role as the primary definer of one’s identity. 
Just as nationality determined one’s exclusionary identity, so did religious sects that distinguished between “we” and 
“the rest.” The best examples are the Taliban who fought against Soviet forces in Afghanistan and the new leaders 
of Iran who ousted the Pahlevi dynasty that had ruled the country since the 1920s. In both instances, Islamic 
fundamentalists demarcated the world between the true believers and the rest, between whom there was to be no 
genuine sharing of anything: no common humanity, no shared destiny, no interchangeable aspirations. Just like 
nations, religious sects were willing to resort to force and to kill those who did not belong.  
It is not surprising, then, that during and after the 1970s there was much serious discussion about the possibility 
of dialogue and mutual understanding among civilizations. Earlier, it was the question of possibilities for peace and 
cooperation among nations that intrigued people concerned with the problem of global governance. These issues 
remained, of course, but they were often overshadowed by the seemingly increasing danger coming from religious 
sects. Because religion is a fundamental definer of a civilization, it is not surprising that the question of the 
relationship among civilizations grew in importance in the 1970s and beyond. Can civilizations really work together, 
or are they inherently incapable of doing so? Are they moving in the same direction so that some day in the future 
they would be just one civilization, human civilization, or would civilizations ultimately collide till one of them 
established its hegemony? 
These questions had fascinated thinkers all over the world for centuries. Especially at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, when many parts of the world were coming together, intellectuals and statesmen alike pondered 
the future of civilizations, or, of civilization. Various parts of the world were coming closer together through 
technological innovations and economic globalization, but did this mean that the various cultures, religions, and 
civilizations were also coming together so that ultimately there would be one common human civilization? Already 
in the field of art, cross-civilizational blending was taking place, as exemplified by European paintings that came 
under the influence of Chinese or Japanese style, and by some European composers who began to incorporate tunes 
and themes from the Middle East, South Asia, or East Asia. On the other hand, some purists persisted in the belief 
that such blending did not alter the essential differences among civilizations. Some sought to preserve a 
civilization’s integrity by rejecting alien elements and reiterating its uniqueness and urity. The pan-Asianist 
movement was a typical example. 
Till after the Second World War, however, these mostly remained abstract questions that concerned only a small 
number of writers and thinkers. As already noted, the future of international relations was far more critical than that 
of inter-civilizational affairs. All this changed in the last decades of the twentieth century, when the relationship 
among civilizations grew in importance just as the relationship among independent states lost its primary as a 
definer of the world community. Already during the 1950s, UNESCO had sponsored a ten-year project on “mutual 
appreciation of Eastern and Western values.” The impetus behind this came from India’s Nehru, who grasped the 
historic moment when he saw that the world was now witnessing the emergence of so many new states, most of 
them non-Western, so that their relationship to the West not just politically and economically but, more 
fundamentally, culturally would become of increasing importance. UNESCO has continued to interest itself in, and 
promote, dialogues among civilizations. Its involvement not just in organizing conferences but in establishing a 
global network of historical heritage sites bespeaks its central role in bringing diverse traditions and belief systems 
together for their mutual understanding. As Jaime Tores-Bodet, one of the earlier secretaries generals of the 
organization, said, war is something that is fought among states, but peace depends upon mutual understanding 
among people, and people represent their respective ways of life. But not just UNESCO but the international 
community on the whole has become steadily more aware of the need to base world order on mutual understanding 
among civilizations, not simply among nations. In 1998 the General Assembly unanimously resolved to call the year 
2001 the year of dialogue among civilizations. If such dialogue had been vigorously pushed in the twentieth century, 
the world would have been a more habitable place, and even the terrorist attacks of the same year might not have 
taken place. 
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Civilizations will remain as important existences as nations, families, and other human associations. Just as one 
seeks to promote a peaceful relationship among nations and families, one must envisage a state of mutual tolerance 
and understanding among civilizations if there is to emerge a stable world order. Global governance is not just a 
matter of some institutional arrangements to prevent violence and enforce some measure of law-abiding behavior 
among states, societies, and individuals. It must also involve recognition that various civilizations must live with one 
another in a spirit of mutual understanding. At the end of the nineteenth century, there was speculation as to whether 
all civilizations were tending toward one unitary civilization, which at that time was seen to be virtually 
synonymous with modern Western civilization. Today, such West-centrism would not be acceptable. But that would 
not mean that we could not consider the coming together of all people in some fashion. Civilizations would continue 
to exist in their separate identities, but civilization   not a particular civilization, but civilization as a shared 
experience and mentality   might become strengthened as the world grew more and more transnationally connected. 
The idea of common humanity, some faith in human dignity and justice, the sharing of information and the respect 
for diversity   all these might come to constitute a basis for the new civilization. The world’s people, in other words, 
would live in their respective civilizations and also develop their common civilization. Neither individual 
civilizations nor collective civilization would be interchangeable with nations and states. Peace would have to built, 
not only on some agreement among nations, or on an accommodation among civilizations, but also upon some 
transnational civilization. 
